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While the path of the economy clearly depends on a lot more than the behavior of consumers, the 
latter is surely one of the key influences on the former. After all, consumer spending counts for 
about two-thirds of the total (more if consumer investments in owner-occupied housing are 
included), and postwar business cycle movements in the U.S. have typically been foreshadowed by 
significant changes in consumer spending, particularly for automobiles and houses. Thus, whether 
the economy will be proceeding along at reasonably satisfactory growth rates, sliding into 
recession, or accelerating into renewed expansion will be heavily influenced by what consumers do. 
Theory 
Consumer spending decisions are influenced by three sets of factors: 
changes in real income growth rates, changes in balance sheet position, 
and changes in "animal spirits", or more prosaically, in consumer 
expectations, attitudes and plans. Most models of consumer behavior 
focus heavily on income and balance sheet variables, with particular 
attention typically paid to changes in transitory and permanent income 
and income taxes, and to net worth. Recent work has also focused on 
the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet, on the grounds that 
liquidity differences are important. Some few models attempt to intro- 
duce expectational measures into the econometrics, but such variables 
typically carry little weight in the models. 
The behavior of the variables in these models is especially interesting 
when viewed over the late 1970s, when the expansion beginning in 1975 
was beginning to show signs of weakening. During 1978, most of the 
* Author's address: F. Thomas Juster, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, P.O. 
Box 1248, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, USA. 
0 167-4870/81/0000-0000/$02.50 © North-Holland 
88 F.T. Juster / Consumer spending prospects 
financial variables that tend to enter consumption equations were 
behaving in ways broadly consistent with sluggish to modest growth in 
consumption. Over this period, for example, real disposable income had 
grown at roughly a four percent growth rate, both consumer installment 
debt and mortgage debt had increased substantially, and prices were 
rising at roughly a seven percent rate. 
The debt changes were particularly noteworthy. Since the middle of 
1977 there had been a veritable explosion in outstanding mortgage 
debt, apparently reflecting some monetization of the rapidly rising 
housing equity among American consumers resulting from fast growing 
housing prices. In the first part of 1977, for example, mortgage debt 
was rising at an annual rate of about $ 70 billion, but in the last half of 
1977 mortgage debt increments averaged about $100 billion. The pace 
slackened off a bit during the first half of 1978, but was still quite high. 
On consumer installment debt, 1976 saw changes running at about $ 20 
billion annual rates, 1977 saw the changes running over $ 30 billion, 
and in later 1978 the data showed changes of $40 billion. To a 
substantially greater extent than usual, the strength in consumption 
spending during this expansion was supported from debt extensions. 
The late 1970s data on consumer expectations and attitudes were a 
little schizophrenic, although on the whole clearly pessimistic. Overall, 
the Michigan Index of Consumer Sentiment reached a peak of 89.1 in 
the May 1977 survey. Since then, it had gone erratically downhill; the 
reading was 82.4 in July 1978, but the low up to that point had actually 
been reached in March of 1978, at a level of 78.8. 
This overall downward sag masked two sharply divergent movements 
in components on the Consumer Sentiment Index. Several measures are 
best thought of as reflecting current buying conditions, and these had 
hardly declined at all from the peaks reached late in 1977. In July, 
1978, for example, the two Current Conditions components were only a 
couple of index points below their recovery highs. In sharp contrast, a 
component best labeled an expectations component had declined quite 
sharply from peaks reached in 1977: two of the expectations measures 
had declined by about 30 index points, the other by about 15 points. 
Thus expectations have been declining more or less steadily since the 
middle of 1977, while current buying conditions had help up quite 
strongly. 
The key to this schizophrenia clearly lay in consumer perceptions of 
and reactions to price increases, and in perceptions about the ability of 
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economic policy to cope with inflation. The pervasive consumer reac- 
tion to general price increases during the postwar period had always 
(with few exceptions) been retrenchment on spending and increases in 
saving. But reactions to prospective price increases for specific items 
like houses and cars can be, and in 1978 was, quite different. The 
survey data are unambiguous on this point: many consumers though 
that this was a good time to buy houses and cars, mainly because they 
expected housing and car prices to rise substantially in future, and 
hence felt that it was better to buy now rather than wait until later. 
Thus anticipatory buying was clearly an important element in consumer 
behavior, and had been holding up the rate of consumer spending in 
the face of increasing pessimism about both short- and long-term 
economic prospects. And consumer skepticism about the ability of 
policy-makers to cope with macro-economic problems underlay their 
pessimism about general economic prospects. 
The key role played by price expectations and judgements about the 
effectiveness of economic policy is shown in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 
tabulates changes in the reasons why consumers expected business 
conditions to be good or bad over the next 12 months or over the next 
five years. Two factors stand out: first, consumers were increasingly less 
likely to regard effective government economic policies as a reason to 
expect good business conditions; second, consumers were increasingly 
more likely to link unfavorable expectations about future business 
conditions to expectations of increased prices. Thus the decline in 
optimism about both short- and long-term business conditions was in 
some significant part due to the expectations that inflation will bring on 
deteriorating business conditions, and to the expectation that economic 
policy would fail to cope with deteriorating business conditions [1]. 
Table 2 addresses the buy-in-advance motivations noted above in the 
text. Here, the proportion of respondents who judge that the present is 
a good time to buy household durables, houses and cars had risen 
sharply over several years prior to 1978, and had held up strongly in 
1978 largely because an increasing proportion of people report that this 
was a good time to buy because prices would be higher in future. As a 
proportion of all favorable opinions about why "this is a good time to 
[1] These data do not reveal whether judgments about the ineffectiveness of economic policy were 
due to the perception that policy-makers were less adept now than formerly, or to the 
perception that the problems.were more intractable than they used to be. 
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buy", the anticipatory buying rationale has almost doubled for house- 
hold durables since 1975 and had exactly doubled for automobiles. 
In a general sense, it can be argued that all of the consumer survey 
data were signalling prospective weakness. Increasing pessimism based 
on deteriorating expectations clearly foreshadows future weakness in 
spending, and while anticipatory buying is a reflection of current 
strength, it is surely a harbinger of future weakness. At some point, 
consumers would decide that the risks of deteriorating financial posi- 
tion no longer warranted buying in advance of expected price increases 
for specific products, and anticipatory buying would come to a halt. 
When that happened, consumer spending would be expected to be 
weaker than if such advance buying had not taken place to begin with, 
and there existed the potential for a significant slide in consumer 
spending. 
Modelling consumption behavior [2] 
Both the real economic variables that influence consumer behavior and 
the anticipatory ones can be combined into a set of forecasting models 
which can be used to view the likely path of future consumption. It is 
an article of faith with most economists that if consumer expectations, 
attitudes and plans are important, they ought to show up in conven- 
tional econometric models as significant independence forces on con- 
sumer behavior. One can of course quarrel with that article of faith: the 
alternative argument essentially says that econometric models are 
doomed to failure because the real world is structurally unstable, hence 
capturing the influence of the past on the present will lead to major 
errors in predicting the future because new and important factor(s) will 
come along to upset the model. 
The resolution of methodological issues like this presumably lies in 
empirical testing. The set of models presented here have been used in 
consumption forecast for the last several years, and represent an 
attempt to combine traditional economic variables with expectational 
measures in a set of single equation demand models. The models do not 
comprise a complete forecasting system, since they contain a number of 
variables that would normally be endogenous to such a system. All the 
[2] The analysis here draws heavily on other work done by the author. 
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Table 1 
Proportion of respondents giving indicated reason for expectations about business conditions. 
91 
Feb. May Aug. Nov. Feb. May 
1977 1977 1977 1977 1978 1978 
For the next 12 months 
Optimistic expectations due 
to favorable references 
to government economic 
policies 24% 14% 115[ 7% 6% 5% 
Pessimistic expectations due 
to unfavorable references 
to expected price increases 6 12 12 13 11 21 
For the next f ive years 
Optimistic expectations due 
to favorable references 
to government economic 
policies 23 18 14 11 10 8 
Pessimistic expectations due 
to unfavorable references 
to expected price increases 7 14 12 14 12 21 
Table 2 
Proportion of respondents giving favorable market evaluations and buy-in-advance price ration- 
ales. 
May May May May June 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1978 
HousehoM durables 
Percent saying 
Good time to buy 37% 
Good because prices will 
go higher 15 
Buy-in-advance reasons as 
a proportion of all 
favorable opinions 0.41 
Cars 
Percent saying 
Good time to buy 30 
Good because prices will 
go higher 11 
Buy-in-advance reasons as 
a proportion of all 
favorable opinions 0.37 
42% 62% 63% 66% 
22 37 31 48 
0.52 0.60 0.49 0.73 
37 48 50 53 
19 27 33 39 
0.51 0.56 0.66 0.74 
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models contain one or more variables reflecting consumer anticipations, 
and they are consciously designed to allow such variables to play an 
important role in explaining behavior. Some of the models are 
dominated by the expectational variables, and conventional variables 
play only minor roles; others are dominated by conventional variables 
and the expectational variables play relatively minor roles. All have well 
developed theoretical and empirical foundations. The models include 
an equation predicting the personal saving rate, an equation predicting 
unit sales of automobiles, and an equation predicting the average "real 
price" of automobiles. 
Saving rate 
The saving rate model is essentially the same as the one presented in 
Juster and Taylor (1975), and essentially blends the Houthakker-Taylor 
zero-depreciation model of saving behavior with the short-run un- 
certaintly influences analyzed in the series of papers by Juster and 
various colleagues (Juster 1973, 1975; Juster and Wachtel 1972). The 
theory is relatively straightforward. In the long run, assuming no 
growth in income or in population, saving would disappears as assets 
become adjusted to the steady-state long-run income level. Thus saving 
arises because of disequilibrium between assets and income, or out of 
population growth. In the short run, changes in various components of 
income (including personal taxes and social security taxes) will produce 
positive or negative saving as part of the adjustment process. Finally, 
uncertainty about real income prospects will have an impact on short- 
run saving behavior, although uncertainty factors are expected to have 
little or no long-run effect. 
In previous work, the author 'along with a number of colleagues has 
used consumer expectations about price changes as a proxy for real 
income uncertainty. The best proxy in most previous work has proved 
to be the variation in expected price change among households, rather 
than the mean level of price change expected by households~ The 
argument is that wide variation among households in the mean ex- 
pected price change will tend to be associated with greater uncertainty 
at the level of individual expected price change, and it is individual 
uncertainty about price changes expected in the future which is the 
principal cause of real income uncertainty. 
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The automobile demand equations differentiate the demand for unit 
sales and the demand for "quality" per unit. Unit sales are explained 
within a stock adjustment framework, but the dynamics of the process 
are subsumed within a measure of automobile purchase probability 
obtained from the surveys. The transitory effects of income change and 
expectations on automobile sales are reflected by another survey mea- 
sure of optimism/pessimism, and by real income change and the rate of 
unemployment. The unit sales equation has several dummy variables 
reflecting special factors in the automobile market--strikes, rebates, 
and inventory cleanup prior to the introduction of new models. 
Automobile "real price" or quality is basically explained by the level 
of real per-family income. In some equations estimated in the past, the 
level of auto unit sales had been found to impact on average quality, 
the presumption being that the distribution of automobile buyers is 
different in boom auto quarters than in average or slack quarters. 
During boom quarters, e.g., relatively low income families are more apt 
to be in the car buying market, and the average quality of the vehicles 
they purchase is apt to be lower. But that variable proved not to be 
important in the version of the model presented here. In these equa- 
tions, automobile unit sales are dominantly explained by expectational 
variables reflecting cyclical swings in income and optimism, while 
automobile real price (quality) is dominantly explained by the level of 
income. 
Empirical estimates 
The basic empirical estimates for the personal saving rate are shown in 
table 3, while estimates for the automobile purchase rate and the 
average real price of automobiles are shown in table 4. 
In the top panel of table 3, the first equation shows the basic 
Houthakker-Taylor saving rate equation. The remainder of the rows 
show the results of estimating equations which add alternative measures 
of the uncertainty effect to the basic model. Equation 2 adds the 
filtered [3] changes in the Index of Consumer Sentiment (ICS), while 
the other equations add both the filtered ICS and a set of lagged 
[3] The filter eliminates changes in the ICS which are neither large nor systematic. The methodol- 
ogy is explained in Juster and Wachtel 1972. 
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variables reflecting either prices or some dimension of expected price 
change. The price measures presented here include actual price change 
as measured by the Consumer Price Index, both the mean and the 
standard deviation of the Michigan data on price changes expected by 
consumers, and both the mean and the variance of price changes 
expected by the panel of professional economic forecasters surveyed by 
the financial columnist, J.A. Livingston. 
In the bottom panel of table 3, a number of constrained regressions 
are shown. All the data in the top half of the table imply very long lags 
in the response of consumer saving to changes in income components 
or in uncertainty. These lags seem unreasonably long on a priori 
grounds, and the bottom half of  the table constraints the coefficient of 
the leg term to imply a quicker response of saving to changes in income 
or uncertainty. 
Several features of these results are worth noting in detail. First, 
while the basic Houthakker-Taylor model produces reasonably good 
fits to the data, the addition of the uncertainty measures cuts the 
residual unexplained variance significantly--by about 20 percent, for 
the best of the equations involving uncertainty variables. Next, while 
the survey measures of expected price changes are slightly superior to 
the Consumer Price Index in unconstrained equations, the expectations 
do quite a bit better in the constrained regressions in the lower part of 
the table. If the constrained regressions convey a more accurate picture 
of the true lag structure in the model, the data suggests that expecta- 
tions about price change contain significant information not contained 
in actual price change, although the actual change is not a bad proxy 
for price expectations. Of the two expectational measures from the 
Michigan data, the standard deviation of the expected price change 
data is a shade better than the mean expected rice change, although the 
margin of superiority is trivial. 
One of the most interesting results in the table is the relatively poor 
performance of the Livingston data on the price expectations held by 
professional economic forecasters, relatively to the price expectations 
held by consumers. The Livingston data have been used in a number of 
studies concerned with the structure of price expectations, partly be- 
cause they have been widely available and partly because they have a 
very long history going back to the late 1940s [4]. In addition, some 
[4] See John A. Carlson 1977; and Mullineaux 1978. 
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would argue on theoretical grounds that the Livingston series is the 
right data to include in models of consumer or business decision 
making. 
The last point is of some methodological as well as practical interest. 
One school of though with substantial influence in many current policy 
discussions takes the view that decisions are made on the basis of 
"rational" expectations, by which is meant simply that decision makers 
act on the basis of the best available information including forecasts of 
the probable impact of economic activity on policy-making. In a world 
with zero information dissemination costs, the professional efforts of 
economic forecasters are presumably worth more weight than the 
unguided guesses of a representative sample of consumers. But there is 
no evidence from table 3 that consumers act in that way: their personal 
saving behavior is not at all well explained by the guesses of profes- 
sional forecasters, which ought to be the proper ingredient in a rational 
expectations world. Rather, they act on the basis of their own expecta- 
tions, which differ significantly and often vary sharply from the expec- 
tations of professional forecasters. Thus, however relevant the rational 
expectations model may be for commodity markets and other market in 
which professional speculative activity is a dominant force, that seems 
not to be true of the formation of consumer expectations about price 
change nor of the behavior relationship between price expectations and 
savings. I find those results both plausible and sensible--and enlighten- 
ing about the appropriate role of the rational expectations theory in 
economic modeling and in the formulation of economic policy. 
Comparison of the SRC data on expected price change and actual 
price change are interesting and potentially illuminating. In the top half 
of the table, as noted above, there is virtually no difference in the fit of 
expected price change (either standard deviation or mean) and actual 
price change: both convey the same impression about the effect of price 
changes on consumer saving behavior, in that they suggest that a rise in 
either actual prices or expected prices (means or standard deviations) 
will result in higher saving. But if the lag structure estimated in the 
model is wrong, in that the response of saving to changes in income 
components or uncertainty is more rapid that that implied by the point 
estimates, then the data in the bottom half of the table become more 
relevant. Here, while both equations necessarily deteriorate somewhat 
in fit, the equation with actual price change deteriorates much more 
rapidly. 
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One explanation for the roughly equivalent impact of actual or 
expected price changes on savings in the top half of the table is that the 
unconstrained equation essentially fits a very long moving average of all 
the independent variables to actual savings. If the moving average is 
long enough, there can hardly be much difference between the explana- 
tory power of expected price changes and actual price changes, pro- 
vided the two bear a reasonably close resemblance to each other, as of 
course they do. But in the constrained regressions in the bottom half of 
the table, one would expect to find greater discriminating power, and 
that comparison clearly favors the role of expected price change in 
determining saving behavior. 
Other tests with the saving model shown in table 3 were also con- 
ducted, primarily to see if the very large coefficients of personal tax 
change, social security tax change, and change in transfer payments 
could be due to the presence of poorly measured seasonal variation. 
The presence of a poor seasonal adjustment for series used in an 
equation consisting of seasonally adjusted variables would be shown by 
significant regression coefficients attached to seasonal dummy variables 
inserted in the equation. But neither straightforward seasonal dummies 
themselves, nor seasonal dummies interacted with particular tax or 
transfer items, proved to be of any use in the equation. In no case was 
the t ratio for either the dummies or the dummies interacted with the 
tax/transfer items more than about 1.5, and in the preferred equation, 
all t ratios were less than one. Hence, whatever is accounting for these 
very strong impacts of tax and transfer changes on saving, it appears 
not to be poor seasonal adjustment of the series themselves. 
The basic saving rate equation does contain a set of dummy variables 
not shown in table 3, which are included to adjust for the effects of 
particular events that the equation should not be expected to reflect. 
Specifically, dummy variables are included for the three automobile 
strike quarters--the fourth quarters of 1964, 1967, and 1970. Automo- 
bile strikes are associated with low levels of automobile sales, and since 
automobile sales are an extremely important determinant of change in 
consumer installment credit, they also have a significant impact on the 
measured personal saving rate. All these dummies had t-ratios in excess 
of 1.7, with the 1964 strike dummy being about three times its standard 
error. In addition, there is some indirect survey evidence to suggest that 
the 1975 cut in personal income taxes had an effect on personal saving 
prior to its implementation, and similar (but less persuasive) evidence 
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that the abortive 1977 second quarter tax cut also had an anticipatory 
impact on saving behavior. Thus the equation has first quarter 1975 
and first quarter 1977 dummy variables, designed to reflect anticipation 
of a tax cut. 
Automobile sales 
The automobile purchase rate model in the paper is very similar to one 
that has been used for some time by the author, and reported in a 
number of papers [5]. The model implies a stock adjustment frame- 
work, with transitory changes in income having a strong effect on 
automobile sales. For the empirical implementation, a good bit of 
evidence suggests that a survey measure of automobile purchase proba- 
bility is a good substitute for the entire stock adjustment process, while 
other survey measures of optimism tend to be superior to objective 
measures of income change. The idea is that consumers reported 
probability of vehicle purchase must reflect the mechanism implied by 
a stock adjustment process, and hence can replace that part of the 
model. 
The equations summarized in table 4 are basically driven by the two 
survey measures of vehicle purchase probability and the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment, but the present version of the model provides 
room for a couple of conventional financial variables--the change in 
real per-household income, and the general unemployment rate. The 
equation also has a number of dummy variables that are not shown in 
the table: three automobile strike quarters are treated with dummy 
variables (1964 : 4, 1967 : 4 and 1970 : 4), there is a dummy variable for 
the extensive automobile rebates in the first quarter of 1975, and there 
is a dummy reflecting the relatively high sales associated with model 
cleanup, assigned to the third quarter of each year. All these dummies 
are statistically significant except for the 1967:4 strike dummy, which 
is marginally significant at conventional levels. 
One interesting aspect of the model fitted through the first quarter of 
1978 is the reemergence of financial variables as having some indepen- 
dent influence on purchase rates. In the version estimated through 
1974, neither level of real per household income, change in income, nor 
[5] For example, Juster and Wachtel 1972. 
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the unemployment rate made significant contributions to an explana- 
tion of purchase rates. But in equations fitted through 1978, both real 
income change and unemployment become significant at conventional 
levels, while the estimated influence of the survey variables is a bit less. 
A possible interpretation of this shift of power in the equation from 
expectational to real financial variables is that the uncertainty which 
has characterized the economy during recent years has meant that 
consumers are more apt to behave in accordance with actual events 
than with events that they anticipate, because the anticipations them- 
selves are less firmly held and therefore less closely linked to actual 
behavior. Given the notorious sensitivity of time series to minor shifts 
in data occasioned by revisions, as well as to the presence or absence of 
other variables, that must be regarded as speculative. But it seems an 
interesting speculation, and is in accord with what does seem clearly the 
case-- that  consumers are much more volatile in their expectations and 
attitudes now than they were back in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the 
increased volatility could mean that the link between expectations and 
behavior has become modified. 
The equation explaining real car price (average quality per car) is 
straightforward. Average car quality appears to be a simple function of 
permanent income, and is reflected by an equation with real per-family 
income and a distributed lag. The equation is also shown in table 4. 
Using models to forecast 
One can use the set of models described above to make predictions of 
the saving rate, the level of automobile sales, the level of real automo- 
bile price (i.e., quality), and automobile demand in constant dollars, 
provided estimates of the relevant independent variables, such as 
changes in real income components and the future values of the survey 
measures, can be obtained. Inserting plausible values of the indepen- 
dent variables into these models would have yielded 1979 predictions of 
an increase in the rate of personal saving, and a decline in the 
automobile sales rate. The second of these events would have been 
accurately foreshadowed, but the first would no t - - the  rate of personal 
saving continued to drop throughout 1979, and reached historically low 
levels during the latter part of that year. 
It is instructive to ask: why would the saving rate model have 
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produced estimates that were wide of the mark during 1979? The 
answer lies in the analysis described earlier in the text, where the 
growing divergence between the current conditions and expectations 
components on the index of the consumer sentiment were discussed. 
While it was clear enough that expectations were getting more pessimis- 
tic, and while they actually became more pessimistic during 1979, it was 
also true that speculative buying, which is reflected by the survey 
measures of current market conditions, grew in strength. But the role of 
price expectation in the above model is to measure uncertainty about 
future changes in real income, and the model contains no provision for 
the role of anticipatory buying in the determination of saving behavior. 
Thus during a period when anticipatory buying forces reached record 
levels in the U.S. economy, a model which behaved quite sensibly 
during most of the postwar period would have provided estimates of 
saving behavior that turned out to be quite far off the mark. 
The basic message from this exercise is that one has to be very chary 
in using time-series models that may reflect shifting relationships. 
Implicitly, the models discussed in this paper could be expected to hold 
in economic environments where the dominant reaction of consumers 
to expectations in rising prices is the conservatism and caution induced 
by the uncertainty associated with changes in future real income. While 
that was true throughout virtually all of the postwar period in the U.S., 
it was clearly not true of developments in 1978 and 1979, where the 
dominant reaction to the expectation of rising prices was speculative 
buying and debt acquisition centered in housing, cars, and durables. 
We may ask: why did U.S. consumers react with a speculative buying 
response to the inflation of 1978-79, while they failed to react in that 
way to the inflation of 1973-74? The likely answer is that consumers 
learned from experience. In 1973-74, when the first bout of double-digit 
inflation associated with rising oil and other raw material prices was 
experienced in the U.S. and the western world generally, consumers 
reacted with the view that those volatile price rises would not be 
associated with gains in money income, hence would be reflected in 
sharply declining real incomes. While real income did in fact decline as 
a consequence of a severe recession, consumers discovered that they 
survived the crisis and that neither their financial status nor the 
economy fell apart in the face of inflationary stresses. Thus, when the 
next episode of double-digit inflation began to appear in the late 1970s, 
they were more impressed by the gains to be obtained from acquiring 
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goods via expanded debt than by the prospective losses resulting from 
the uncertainties associated with an overextended financial position. 
And the proposition that consumer spending would collapse when the 
speculative buying fever finally burst was strikingly demonstrated dur- 
ing the early spring of 1980, when the speculative buying measures 
collapsed, and with them consumer spending, in the aftermath of the 
vigorous anti-inflation and credit control measures announced by the 
Federal Reserve Board and the President in March of that year. 
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